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Abstract² The TeDP concept has been presented as a possible 
solution to reduce aircraft emissions despite the continuing trend 
for increased air traffic. However, much of the benefit of this 
concept hinges on the reliable transfer of electrical power from the 
generators to the electrical motor driven propulsors. Protection 
and fault management of the electrical transmission and 
distribution network is crucial to ensure flight safety and to 
maintain the integrity of the electrical components on board. 
Therefore a robust fault management strategy is required. With 
consideration of the aerospace-specific application, the fault 
management strategy must be efficient, of minimal weight and be 
capable of a quick response to off-nominal conditions. This paper 
investigates how the TeDP architecture designs are likely to be 
driven by the development of appropriate fault management 
strategies. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The motivation to develop TeDP aircraft is driven by a desire 
to reduce aircraft noise, emissions and fuel burn [1].  An 
important aspect of the development of TeDP aircraft is that 
thrust is provided by propulsors powered by electrical motors 
[2]. Hence for the aircraft to maintain flight safely, a reliable 
supply of continuous power of an appropriate quality to the 
electrical motors is required. The electrical power network must 
be capable of distributing the electrical power from the 
generators to the motors during both normal and fault 
conditions.  
Hence it is necessary for the system to be able to implement 
a fault management strategy when off-nominal scenarios occur. 
At a basic level, the fault management strategy underpinning all 
TeDP and conventional aircraft designs is mitigation against an 
engine-out failure scenario [3]. It is assumed that all fault 
management strategies for any chosen TeDP system will 
incorporate this essential capability and that the propulsors and 
other system components are sized accordingly [4]. 
However highly reliable, compact electrical networks 
require a wider view of fault management beyond engine failure 
[3]. Faults occurring downstream in the network also have to be 
considered since these too may contribute to a detrimental loss 
of thrust if the system does not respond appropriately. Thus the 
scope of fault management must consider the system as a whole. 
A pertinent challenge when considering the development of an 
appropriate fault management strategy is that the response of the 
system to a network fault is currently not fully understood [5]. 
In addition to the system response, the fault management system 
must also encapsulate system design, fault  prevention, 
reconfiguration and condition monitoring.  
In order to define optimal fault management more fully, this 
paper will first discuss a number of key objectives for fault 
management strategies. Secondly, a number of approaches to 
TeDP architecture design are identified in the literature. The 
resulting different approaches to fault management are 
discussed, highlighting the interdependency between fault 
management strategy and architecture. Finally, a selected case 
study is investigated in simulation, providing an insightful 
illustration of how architecture design is driven by fault 
management strategy.  
II. IMPORTANCE OF FAULT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
A. Overview 
In response to a fault scenario occurring on a TeDP electrical 
power system, the fault management strategy must ensure that 
the power delivered to the propulsors is above the minimum 
power demand at any specific moment in flight. This may 
include the appropriate isolation of faulted sections of network 
and re-routing of power to non-faulted sections.  These fault 
management requirements put significant design constraints on 
the electrical architecture sizing and redundancy.  The total 
weight of the electrical power system on a TeDP aircraft must 
not increase the fuel burn of the aircraft such that the potential 
efficiency benefits of the TeDP concept are lost.  The choice of 
particular technologies, for example solid state circuit breakers, 
may be undesirable due to high cryogenic cooling requirements 
[6]. Similarly the impact of additional redundant cables or 
increased power rating of components on system weight and 
efficiency requires careful consideration. 
Further fault management strategy challenges for future 
aircraft include: 
x Protection equipment must fit within the airframe which 
constrains volume and placement of devices.  
x Failures in cables and other electrical equipment must 
not cause failure of other components in the vicinity, 
especially fuel lines.  
x The heat produced during a fault needs to be quickly and 
safely dissipated, to mitigate against propagation of 
quench (where the system is superconducting) [6] 
x The desired protection technology may not be available 
at the required specification, for example at higher 
voltage levels (in the order of kV [7] ) or able operate 
sufficiently fast (in the order of microseconds [8]). 
B. Key Success Criteria for Fault Management Strategies 
1) Early consideration in design process 
In the first instance, potential fault management strategies for a 
particular network need to be identified and understood. It is 
then possible to scope the impact of each means of fault 
mitigation on the design of the network. Finally an optimal 
electrical power system design is selected, which can be 
adequately protected. Conversely, if protection is added as an 
afterthought to an established network design, an appropriate 
fault management system which can operate within system 
constraints may not be possible.  For example, the weight 
penalty of the protection devices and redundancy may become 
inhibitive or lead to a solution which cannot provide the required 
levels of reliability. Alternatively, the necessary device 
specification may not be technically possible. This is 
summarized in Fig. 1. 
It is anticipated that the  fault management strategy may need 
to be adapted to accommodate other external factors, such as 
changes to the physical shape of the aircraft. The fault 
management system would then be reconsidered, leading to 
reconsideration of the network architecture, thus creating a 
cyclic design process. 
2) Consideration of required speed of response  
It is critical that the appropriate speed of response of the fault 
management system is identified. The architecture design will 
heavily influence this characteristic.  For example if the 
electrical system on an aircraft includes converter interfaced 
sections of DC network with appropriate filters and low 
impedance cabling, then early studies have shown that 
unmanaged, low impedance faults will propagate quickly 
through the network [6].  The development of a fault 
management strategy with an appropriately fast response is 
extremely challenging.  Different architectures may result in 
different speeds of fault propagation, which may result in fault 
management strategies which are more, or less, challenging. 
3) Optimal reconfiguration 
A fault management strategy must not only identify and 
locate a fault within a very short time frame. The fault must also 
be isolated and the power rerouted as appropriate before the 
reduction in the delivery of power to the propulsion motors 
becomes critical [4]. Hence the fault management system is 
more extensive than just the protection devices within the 
system: it must also be able to optimally reconfigure the 
available network as appropriate. This is highly dependent on 
the system architecture. For example, this may involve operation 
of bus ties, cable circuit breakers or joining of ring busbars. This 
aspect of fault management must consider all possible required 
changes to the nominal network and with an ultimate aim to 
ensure that the thrust remains symmetrically distributed (as 
possible) in the event that a fault should occur.  
 
Fig. 1. Interdependency of Architecture and Fault Management 
The method of isolating a faulty section of network will also 
strongly influence whether or not it can easily be recovered. If a 
section of the network is removed due to quench, then it is 
expected that the cable recovery time will be in the order of 
seconds to minutes [9]. This then has an implication on the 
system use as, depending on when exactly the fault occurs, it 
may not be feasible to bring the cable online again during flight. 
Thus the fault management strategy firstly has a significant 
impact on the flexibility of power flow, and secondly defines the 
way in which post-fault system recovery is controlled. 
4) Targeted protection installation and operation 
A further aim of the fault management strategy is to 
anticipate faults based on probability and severity, and 
implement a targeted response. It is not clear which type of fault 
effect (such as energy at the point of fault, instability or voltage 
droop) will have the greatest impact on the network architecture. 
The fault management strategy should ideally be robust and 
capable of mitigating against a variety of failure scenarios, and 
as a result is likely to require a tailored solution to address 
application-specific component sizing and expected failures. 
C. Interdepency of Fault Management and Architecture 
As discussed in Section II. B, the fault management strategy 
is a major driver for the TeDP electrical power system 
architecture design. To illustrate this further, the several aspects 
of fault management have been selected and their impact on 
corresponding architecture specifications discussed. 
1) Quenching 
It is suggested in the literature that a quenched cable may 
assist with limiting fault current [10]. If the effect of quenching 
is used in this way then there will need to be some means (e.g. a 
circuit breaker) in the system of isolating the quenched section. 
Alternatively, a redundant cable could be used as a replacement 
while the cable recovers. This approach may be attractive due to 
the expected significant weight penalty attributable to solid state 
circuit breakers due to their high on-state losses [6]. However, it 
must be considered that quench recovery may take a significant 
amount of time.  In either case, a fault management strategy 
allowing areas to quench means that there will need to be a 
sufficient number of circuit breakers or parallel redundant cables 
installed.  In addition there may need to be increased sizing of 
system components to allow the remaining network to 
compensate for the loss of power delivery. 
2) Flexibility 
If one aspect of the fault management strategy is to have 
flexibility in the power path between the power converters and 
the motors, (so that the network can be reconfigured after a 
section has been isolated) the architecture requires appropriate 
ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ
redundant cables, busbars and bus ties. The increase in system 
complexity provides significant challenges to develop an 
architecture with optimal performance in terms of weight and 
efficiency [3].  
3) Energy storage 
Energy storage has been proposed for more-electric aircraft 
applications both for fast network transients using high power 
density energy storage, and slower network transients, using 
high energy density energy storage [11], [12].  Therefore it 
would not be unreasonable to develop TeDP fault management 
strategy which includes the use of energy storage.  However, 
whilst energy storage has been proposed for TeDP electrical 
power systems  it is not yet clear what the exact role of the 
energy would be [4], [7], and whether this would change over 
the course of the flight [4]. The function of the energy storage 
during a fault would dictate not only the choice of energy 
storage, but its role during non-fault conditions and its location 
on the network. Hence it would influence the architecture 
design.  Caution with the control of energy storage must also be 
taken, to ensure that energy storage does not increase the 
severity of a fault by discharging into a low impedance fault 
[13].   
III. FAULT MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES 
A. Overview 
In order to highlight the way in which a chosen fault 
management strategy can impact network architecture and the 
protection methods which would be appropriate, three fault 
management case studies from the published literature have 
been selected for discussion. The selected case studies reinforce 
that electrical system design for TeDP systems is strongly driven 
by fault management strategy. In all of the studied cases the 
electrical transmission and distribution network has been chosen 
to be DC.  The reduction in losses [2] and reduced cabling [4] 
make medium voltage DC an attractive choice. The fault 
management strategies studied cover three possible cases: 
x DC fault current can be interrupted, provided that the 
current is prevented from reaching its maximum by use 
of fault current limiters. 
x DC fault current can be interrupted, but the weight of the 
circuit breakers will be large and so their use on the 
network is constrained. 
x DC fault current cannot be interrupted, so the faulted 
network must be bypassed instead.Cross-Redundant 
Radial Architecture 
The TeDP system in [4] (Fig. 2) is built on the assumption 
that it will not be possible or optimal to interrupt the maximum 
fault current in a medium voltage DC network. This is based on 
an assumption that the presence of high fault level sources like 
filter capacitors within a low resistance superconducting 
network will result in significant fault current peaks [5].  
 
Fig. 2. Cross-Redundant Radial Architecture [4] 
This fault management strategy operates with 
superconducting fault current limiters (SFCLs) be placed on all 
the sections of the network to restrict fault currents to below 
critical current levels. However, in order to isolate  a faulted 
section of the network the inclusion of solid state circuit 
breakers (SSCBs) at the protection zone interfaces is required.   
Whilst initial studies have indicated that SFCLs have minimal 
impact on system performance, SSCBs do have significant 
detrimental impact on system performance (weight and 
efficiency) [6]. 
It is the choice of a radial architecture that has led to this fault 
management strategy. Furthermore, the feasibility of this design 
is sensitive to the future development of protection devices such 
as SFCLs and SSCBs. If, for example, due to physical airframe 
size or  required electrical power system performance it would 
not be practical to have as many SFCLs or SSCBs on the 
network as shown in Fig. 2 then there would need to be a trade-
off between the impact of an unrestrained fault current and the 
resulting increase in circuit breaker current rating that may then 
be required. This increased current rating would in turn further 
increase the weight penalty attributable to the protection system. 
Consideration should also be given as to whether expected fault 
current levels will be the main design driver for the electrical 
network, or whether other aspects, e.g. instability, thrust lapses 
or thermal system faults, will also have significant influence. 
B. Voltage Source Architecture with Fast Disconnects 
,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKH ³Cross-Redundant Radial Architecture´, 
the design RI WKH ³Voltage Source Architecture with Fast 
Disconnects´ [7] (Fig. 3) is based upon the assumption that it 
will be possible to interrupt the current but the number of circuit 
breakers which can be added to the network will be limited due 
to technological or weight constraints. Hence circuit breakers are 
only used at key selected points in the network: where the power 
converters interface with the distribution system, and at the AC 
terminals of the machines.  
 
Fig. 3.  Voltage Source Architecture with Fast Disconnects [7] 
However, this architecture has been designed with ³6XSHU
)DVW 'LVFRQQHFWV´. These are used to UHFRQILJXUH WKH µGHDG¶
network to isolate the faulty section, only after all fault current 
producing elements have been disconnected by the circuit 
breakers. The circuit breakers are then reclosed to restore power 
to healthy sections of network. It is proposed that this allows for 
a significant overall weight saving as the superfast disconnects 
have a power density of circa 600 kW/kg compared to 200 
kW/kg for the circuit breakers [7]. The superfast disconnects 
have an expected operating time of 1 ms [7]. The process of fault 
management may be more complex than the network in Fig. 2 
because the disconnects must wait until the fault has been 
isolated since they have no current interruption capability. The 
communications required to operate the protection in this case 
require a sequential fault management process which must run 
successfully through each stage until the fault is cleared.   This 
may increase the response time to a fault, which may be 
significant to maintaining appropriate levels of system 
performance. 
Therefore, this architecture is dependent on an appropriately 
fast protection system response, the combined weight of the DC 
circuit breakers and disconnects, and the desired level of 
flexibility in the network reconfiguration. Hence it is evident 
that using disconnects with no current interruption ability as part 
of a fault management strategy has an impact on the placement 
of circuit breakers as well as the simplicity of the system 
response to a fault. 
C. Ring Architecture 
In the case that it is not possible to interrupt the DC current, 
then an alternative design proposal [7] (shown in Fig. 4) 
proposes shorting out (or bypassing) the faulted section of the 
network. This fault management approach requires a current 
source converter interfaced DC system, to enable a constant 
current to be maintained, including during system disturbances.  
 
Fig. 4. Ring Architecture [7] 
IV. INVESTIGATION OF EXAMPLE FAULT MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
A. Overview  
To date, there are a limited number of published studies on 
the fault management approaches for TeDP systems and these 
have focused on the radial TeDP architecture [6][14]. However, 
WKH³5LQJ$UFKLWHFWXUH´KDVEHHQVHOHFWHGIRUDGHWDLOHGVWXG\DV
it presents a possible solution in the event that it is not 
technologically possible (or desirable due to performance 
constraints) to interrupt DC current in a DC TeDP transmission 
and distribution system. The system was modelled to investigate 
some of the key enabling factors for this architecture which are 
listed below:  
x The system response when the switch operates to bypass 
the load. 
x The impact of the speed of the response to the fault on 
the system voltage level.  
x The impact on the remaining propulsion loads when one 
load quenches and is subsequently shorted out. 
B. Development of System Model 
A representation of a single ring busbar as described in Fig.4 
was modelled as shown in Fig. 5. The power required by the 
loads on a single ring busbar was rated at 12.5 MW (half of the 
minimum 25 MW rolling take-off power available from a single 
engine) [3]. 7KH WRWDO UHVLVWLYH ORDG ZDV WDNHQ WR EH  ȍ DV
defined by the power rating of the loads and the system voltage. 
Variable resistors are used to represent the superconducting 
cables. Values of cable inductance utilized are presented in 
Table 1. The ring busbar was set to operate within the possible 
voltage range of 1 to 10 kV [7]. The rate of quench (kquench) used ZDVȍVZKLFK LVDW WKHORZHUHQGRISRVVLEOHYDOXHVIRU
kquench presented in [8]. This results in higher fault currents as the 
lack of resistance in the network leads to a reduction in available 
damping. 
  
TABLE I.  CABLE VALUES USED IN SIMULATION 
 
Line Inductance 
(µH/m) 
Length of 
Cable (m) 
Inductance 
(µH) 
Load 
Cable 0.2a 5a 1 
Busbar 0.2a 5a 1 
a. Based on values in [15]   
b. Based on estimates in [7] 
 
 
Fig. 5. Circuit Diagram  
In Fig. 5, representing the upstream network, the behavior of 
the current controlled converter is approximated by a current 
controlled DC voltage source and series inductance 
representation. This is then connected in series with the loads. A 
bypass switch is placed in parallel with each of the loads to 
provide fault bypass/isolation capability. Since there are four 
propulsive motors on each ring busbar, the model contains four 
loads identical to that shown in Fig. 5. This then allows the effect 
of a single quenching incident on one load branch on the 
remaining loads to be assessed. 
C. Investigation of Fault Impact on System Voltage and 
Current 
During system operation, the current source should maintain 
a stable, constant output current. To achieve this, the terminal 
voltage across the source needs to adjust accordingly. At the 
point when quench occurs, the series current in the ring busbar 
decreases due to the increased resistance of the fault. This leads 
to an overshoot in source voltage in the time between the quench 
beginning and the bypass switch shorting out the faulted section 
of network.  
After the system has reached steady state, each of the four 
propulsor load cables are set to quench sequentially (emulating 
fault effects), with the bypass switches effectively diverting the 
current flow from the affected branch after each fault. The 
bypass switch was set to close after 10 ms. This is much slower 
than quoted in [7] but was chosen in this case to show the system 
response clearly. The simulated source voltage during these 
events is shown in Fig. 6. The level of overshoot and change in 
impedance ratio of the quenched cable to the load is shown in 
Table II. The resistance of each fault after 10 ms is 1 ȍ
(representing D  ȍV TXHQFK rate). The reduction in the 
system impedance as loads are shorted leads to higher voltage 
peaks during quench.  
TABLE II.  VOLTAGE OVERSHOOT FOR VARIOUS SIMULATED QUENCHES 
 Overshoot Values 
Loads on 
Busbar 
Disconnected 
Rquench
:Rloads 
Peak 
Value 
(V) 
Source 
Voltage 
(V) 
Overshoot 
Amplitude 
(V) 
Overshoot 
Amplitude 
(%) 
1 0.50 13517 10000 3517 35% 
2 0.67 11056 7500 3556 47% 
3 1.00 9211 5000 4211 84% 
4 
Rloads = ȍ 6461 2500 3961 158% 
 
 
Fig. 6. Source Voltage Profile for Multiple Sequential Quenches 
It is evident that the delay between the fault occurring and 
the operation of the switch bypassing the affected branch leads 
to potentially detrimental variations in current,  reducing 
available thrust as less power is delivered to the motors. An 
additional concern is that current overshoots occurring 
immediately after the bypass switch operation may risk 
quenching of non-faulted cables.  Therefore, the sensitivity of 
the system to changes in the time taken for the switch to operate 
was examined by simulating the model for a range of operating 
times operating at 5 kV, as shown in Fig. 7.   
The results in Fig. 7 and Table III demonstrate that the 
operating time of the bypass switch is critical, particularly when 
the system impedance is low. The switching time of 1 ms 
(highlighted in bold in Table III) is the expected operating time 
of the bypass switch (this may be reduced to 0.1 ms if 
superconducting contactors are developed) [7].  The component 
specifications for this system (e.g. voltage tolerances) are clearly 
dependent on the response time of the fault management system, 
providing further indication that the fault management strategy 
must be developed prior to architecture system design. 
 The required closing time will depend on the component 
voltage tolerance ratings and the maximum increase in 
temperature that is acceptable during a quench. The availability, 
weight and volume of a switch able to operate in the appropriate 
kV range with a switching time in the order of ms will dictate 
whether this fault management strategy is in fact feasible in the 
future. These results show values for an operating point of 
 
Fig. 7 Source Voltage Profile for Various Switching Times 
TABLE III.  OVERSHOOT DATA FOR VARIOUS SWITCHING TIMES 
Operating 
Time of 
Switch (ms) 
Peak Voltage 
Source Value (V) 
Peak 
Overshoot (V) 
Overshoot 
(%) 
0.1 5022.82 22.82 0.45% 
0.5 5122.17 122.17 2.39% 
1 5245.15 245.15 4.67% 
2.5 5607.96 607.96 10.84% 
5 6173.00 1173.00 19.00% 
7.5 7015.00 2015.00 28.72% 
10 8262.00 3262.00 39.48% 
 
5000_V, yet if the system voltage is specified closer to 10 kV or 
even higher, the voltage increase could be even more 
problematic for component voltage tolerances. This reinforces 
the importance of robust protection for cables and components 
with a rapid rate of quench and high reliability requirements. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that the fault management strategy will define the 
viable architectures for a TeDP electrical power system.   A key 
driver for the fault management strategy is the operation of the 
electrical power system during off-nominal conditions. This 
impacts strongly on architecture choice and required network 
redundancy.  The speed of response and the ability of the system 
to re-route power must be considered not only from the 
perspective of maintaining appropriate power to loads, but also 
to ensure system stability.  The impact of system reconfiguration 
on the subsequent fault response of the system must also be 
given careful consideration. Furthermore, all of these 
specifications must be fulfilled within the stringent weight and 
volume constraints which apply to aircraft systems. 
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